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Payne: Establishing Reliability Under California Evidence Code Section 7

COMMENT
ESTABLISHING RELIABILITY UNDER CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE
CODE SECTION 721(B)(3): WHY CALIFORNIA'S EVIDENTIARY
LAW COULD USE MORE CONSISTENCY
Consider the following hypothetical, based on a real case': Officer
Smith was on duty in a marked highway patrol vehicle driving
westbound on Interstate 8 at 2:15 a.m. He observed a black two-door
Honda swerving within its lane. After watching the vehicle for a few
minutes, Officer Smith witnessed it swerve onto the shoulder and back
into the lane three times. Officer Smith initiated an enforcement stop.
When Officer Smith contacted Joe, the driver, he noticed a strong
odor of alcohol. Officer Smith also observed that Joe had red watery
eyes. With Joe's cooperation, Officer Smith administered five field
sobriety tests, all of which indicated intoxication. One of the tests
administered was a Preliminary Alcohol Screening (PAS) test. This
test measured Joe's blood alcohol content at .084%.
After the PAS test, and based on the totality of the circumstances,
Officer Smith placed Joe under arrest for driving while under the
influence of alcohol. Upon arrival at the San Diego County Jail, Joe
was required to blow two breath samples into an Intoxilyzer
Electrochemical/Infrared (Intox EC/IR) instrument, a machine more
accurate and sophisticated than the PAS test. Both Intox EC/IR tests
measured a .07% blood alcohol content. The San Diego City Attorney
charged Joe with driving a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol and driving a vehicle while having 0.08% or more alcohol in
his blood. Joe pled not guilty to both counts.
At the preliminary hearing, Joe's attorney stated it is common for
prosecuting attorneys to present an expert to testify about the theory of
retrograde extrapolation, which he argued was the concept of taking a
blood alcohol result at some point in time and going backward to
determine the blood alcohol level at an earlier point based on the
1. The names in the hypothetical are not the same as the individuals involved
in the real case.
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passage of time. Moving to exclude this theoretical evidence and the
numerical PAS test results, Joe's attorney further asserted that the
prosecution would have to follow the Kelly test to bring the expert
testimony before the court.2
The prosecution replied that its expert should be allowed to testify
as to his opinion regarding the average rate at which alcohol is burned
off based on his training, experience, and research. The prosecution
also contended that the expert, using the result of a blood alcohol test,
could calculate what that person's blood alcohol level was at an earlier
time because there would be a burn off rate. The prosecutor stated that
the concept of retrograde extrapolation was fairly well accepted and
researched in the DUI community, and that it would be improper to
limit the expert's testimony on the concept. He added that Joe's
attorney could attack any issues regarding the theory during crossexamination. Joe's motion to exclude the evidence was denied.
Joe's counsel then stated that they would bring their own expert,
Jack, who would testify contrary to the prosecution's theories of
retrograde extrapolation. Jack was a young scientist who had only
recently qualified as an expert. 3 Jack would testify that there was an
article written approximately one year earlier which contended that
alcohol burn off rates were likely much slower than the DUI
community believed. The article was published in a little-known
magazine and did not gain much credibility within the scientific
community. However, the only requirement for getting the article
before the jury was that one expert testify that it was reliable,
regardless of what any other expert or community of experts believed.
2. The Kelly test refers to the standard by which a party must prove the
reliability of a new scientific technique before evidence obtained through the
technique can be admitted into evidence. If a party can show that the new technique
has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community, then evidence
obtained with the technique may be admitted. People v. Williams, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d
521, 527 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (citing People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal.
1976)). Thus, Joe's defense counsel argued that the prosecution must first establish
that the theory of retrograde extrapolation had been generally accepted in the DUI
community before their expert could give an opinion based on the theory.
3. A witness may qualify as an expert if "he has special knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the
subject to which his testimony relates. . . . [This expertise] may be shown by any
otherwise admissible evidence, including his own testimony." CAL. EVID. CODE §
720 (West 2007).
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol45/iss2/6
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Since 1967, the California Evidence Code (CEC) has allowed4
texts to be used on cross-examination to impeach expert testimony.
This form of impeachment is extremely valuable because it allows
counsel to highlight an expert's weaknesses when the expert testifies
contrary to established authority. 5 Originally, the rule allowed counsel
to read excerpts from "learned treatises" as long as the expert on the
stand had referred to, considered, or relied on the publication when
forming his or her opinion, or if the publication had been admitted in

evidence.

6

However, in 1997, subdivision (b)(3) was adopted to amend
California Evidence Code section 721.' This new subdivision allows
an expert to be cross-examined with several types of publications, not
just learned treatises. 8 The use of a publication is permitted on crossexamination, even when the expert on the stand does not recognize the
publication, so long as any other expert testifies that it is
authoritative. 9 This ten-year old amendment has raised several issues
for trial attorneys, many of which have yet to be resolved in any
published California opinion. 10

4. CAL. EVID. CODE § 721 (West 2007); S. RULES COMM., 1997-1998 REG.
SESS., S. FLOOR ANALYSES ON S.B. 73, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/9798/bill/sen/sb_0051-0100/sb_73_cfa_19970902_093201_sen floor.html [hereinafter
S. Rules Comm. Bill Analysis].
5. S. Rules Comm. Bill Analysis, supra note 4.
6. Id.

7. § 721.
8. Id.; see also, e.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d
170, 182 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (suggesting that several types of publications may be
admissible, including "text books, pamphlets, and periodicals").
9. Salgo, 317 P.2d 170, 182.
10. See generally Rosen v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. Al 13267, 2007 WL
3361312, at *14 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2007) (each party and the trial judge had
separate and conflicting interpretations of section 721, and of how a publication may
be deemed reliable); Lopez v. Rashidi, No. E030977, 2004 WL 161795, at *12 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2004) ("[iut is not clear whether the requirement that [a] treatise be
established as reliable authority is governed by Evidence Code section 403" or 405);
Stoll v. Bush, No. B159275, 2003 WL 22792314, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25,
2003) (acknowledging that neither the parties' nor the court's own research had
disclosed any California case on point regarding whether California Evidence Code
section 721 required reliability to be established by a "designated expert").
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2008
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With this amendment, there is a concern that unreliable
publications will be used to cross-examine reliable expert witnesses.11
The CEC allows witnesses like Jack, the questionable young expert, to
simply testify that a publication is reliable. 2 Once Jack testifies as
such, any well-experienced expert may be cross-examined with a
little-known article that expresses an opinion contrary to that of the
expert's on the stand. Attorneys may attempt to highlight the article's
weaknesses by asking questions of their expert on redirect. However,
this will only be possible if the attorney had notice that the article
would be presented on cross-examination, and therefore had an
opportunity to research it and find its weaknesses prior to trial.13
Because the rule does not require attorneys to provide notice of which
publications will be used on cross-examination, 14 it may often be the
case that attorneys are not prepared to reveal a publication's
weaknesses on redirect. Ultimately, the jury is left weighing the
opinion of the expert on the stand with that of the "reliable" article,
whose author never testifies before them and is never subject to crossexamination. The amendment is not without value, but changes should
be made so that California Evidence Code section 721(b)(3) can be
used in the manner the legislature envisioned: to safeguard the
15
integrity of the trial while saving time and money.
There must be clear guidelines for establishing a publication as a
reliable authority. Because the authors of these texts never appear
before the jury, the standards for ensuring that a text is reliable enough
to come before a jury should be just as stringent as the standards for
ensuring that new scientific techniques are sufficiently reliable to
come before a jury.
11. S. Rules Comm. Bill Analysis, supra note 4.
12. § 721.
13. See, e.g., Mark B. Canepa, Reevaluating Expert Testimony Following the
Recent Amendment to Evidence Code Section 721, 20 CEB Civ. LITIG. RPTR. 49, 54

(1998) (acknowledging that attorneys will have to do "their own review of available
literature" in the relevant field, so that they are prepared to rebut propositions in a
given text).
14. See § 721.
15. S. Rules Comm. Bill Analysis, supra note 4. Sponsoring the adoption of

California Evidence Code section 721(b)(3), the State Bar argued that the
amendment would protect against the use of "outdated or otherwise unreliable
treatises" and would also reduce time and expense. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol45/iss2/6
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Judicial notice is one way publications are permitted on crossexamination.1 6 However, the judge cannot be required to hold a minitrial for every publication to determine authoritative status; therefore,
the burden of establishing reliability must be left on the attorneys. To
help assess reliability, there must be a requirement that counsel
provide the opposing party with notice of any publication and its
contents before using it to cross-examine the opposing party's expert
witness. There should also be a standard of peer review, or overall
acceptance of the text. Thus, the propounding party should be required
to prove that the publication is generally accepted and consistent with
established thought in the profession. This standard is consistent with
7
the requirements of California's Kelly test.'
This comment explains, in three parts, the present state of the law

regarding California's allowance of learned treatises on crossexamination and the ways this law can become more valuable to trial
attorneys. Part I provides a background of the evolution of California

Evidence Code section 721 to its present state. Part II provides
examples of how other jurisdictions have resolved ambiguities in their
rules analogous to California Evidence Code section 721(b)(3). Part
III contends that using the Kelly standard when admitting publications
on cross-examination would be a beneficial and consistent approach
for California to follow.
I. How THE LIBERAL APPROACH TO CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE

SECTION 721 EVOLVED
The California Evidence Code has allowed learned treatises to be
used on cross-examination to impeach expert testimony since 1967.18
16. CAL. EVID. CODE § 721(b)(3) (West 2007).
17. See People v. Williams, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521, 527 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(citing People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976)) (requiring proof that a
new scientific technique has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community, before such evidence may be admitted). The Kelly test only applies to
new scientific techniques, but to foster consistency and ensure greater reliability, it
seems appropriate to also apply the Kelly test to the admission of scientific
publications.
18. § 721. While the CEC has allowed learned treatises on cross-examination
since 1967, the practice has been permitted under the state's common law beginning
as early as 1891:
Language in several [early] cases indicated that the cross-examiner could
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2008
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When first enacted, the rule allowed counsel to read excerpts from
learned treatises if the expert on the stand had "referred to, considered,
or relied upon the publication in forming his or her opinion, or [when]
the publication [had] already been admitted in evidence."' 9 This
traditional rule was intended to protect the jury from hearing excerpts
of publications that were based on "inadequate research, unexpressed
qualifications, or other factors of unreliability that might be revealed if
2°
the author were subject to cross-examination."
Most jurisdictions allow experts to be cross-examined with the
use of learned treatises; however, each jurisdiction varies on how
liberally they allow such cross-examination. 21 Four main categories of
decisions have emerged in jurisdictions across the nation allowing
learned treatises on cross-examination, ranging from most stringent to
most liberal allowance. 22 The first category of cases allows treatises to
be used on cross-examination only if the expert witness on the stand
has cited the treatise in support of his opinion. 23 The next group of
decisions allows the cross-examination of experts using authorities
which the expert did not use, but which are in the same category of
texts that he did rely on. 24 A third category allows an expert to be
cross-examined with texts that he has personally recognized as
use books to test the competency of an expert witness, whether or not the
expert relied on books in forming his opinion. Fisher v. Southern Pac.
R.R., 89 Cal. 399, 26 Pac. 894 (1891); People v. Hooper, 10 Cal. App. 2d
332, 51 P.2d 1131 (1935). [Later] decisions [indicated], however, that the
opinion of an expert witness [had to] be based either generally or
specifically on books before the expert [could] be cross-examined
concerning them. Lewis v. Johnson, 12 Cal.2d 558, 86 P.2d 99 (1939);
Salgo v. Leland Stanford etc. Bd. Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317
P.2d 170 (1957); Gluckstein v. Lipsett, 93 Cal. App. 2d 391, 209 P.2d 98
(1949).
§ 721 cmt.
19. S. Rules Comm. Bill Analysis, supra note 4.
20. Canepa, supra note 13, at 49 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 721 cmt. 3
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 1903 (3d ed. 1986)).
21. See generally W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Use of Medical or Other Scientific
Treatises in Cross-Examination of Expert Witnesses, 60 A.L.R.2d 77 (1958)
(summarizing all of the ways learned treatises are permitted in cross-examination
throughout multiple jurisdictions).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol45/iss2/6
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25
reliable, even if he did not use those texts when forming his opinion.
The final category of cases allows any text to be used on crossexamination as long as the text has been established as reliable
authority, regardless of whether the expert on the stand is familiar
26
with the particular text.

Early California decisions addressing this issue ranged widely,

leaving little guidance for attorneys planning to use texts on crossexamination.2 7 In 1997, however, an amendment was adopted which
allows an expert to be cross-examined with any text, even when the
expert on the stand does not recognize the publication as authoritative,
so long as some expert testifies that the publication is authoritative.2 8
The CEC now permits an expert to be cross-examined with the use of
any publication, not just learned treatises, if: (1) he relied on the
publication in forming his opinion; (2) the publication was admitted in
evidence; (3) an expert testified that the publication was reliable; or
(4) the judge made a determination that the publication was reliable. 2 9
This rule is modeled after Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE)
803(18), an exception to the hearsay rule.3 ° The federal courts have
adopted a liberal interpretation of FRE 803(18) that favors

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. CAL. EVID. CODE § 721 cmt. (West 2007). Compare Fisher v. Southern
Pac. R.R. Co., 26 P. 894, 896 (Cal. 1891) (suggesting that attorneys may crossexamine opposing experts with texts that the expert did not rely on, if the expert had
testified that he did rely on other texts), and Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd.
of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 182 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (holding that other medical works
are admissible on cross-examination if the expert on the stand had based his opinion
"either generally or specifically on a medical work or medical works"), with Bailey
v. Kreutzmann, 75 P. 104, 105 (Cal. 1904) (holding medical works admissible on
cross-examination if the specific work was relied on by the expert on the stand).
28. § 721.
29. Id.
30. S. Rules Comm. Bill Analysis, supra note 4. FRE 803(18) permits the jury
to hear statements from "published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets" if those
publications were established as reliable authority by expert testimony, even though
those statements are technically hearsay, FED. R. EVID. 803(18). California's rule
slightly differs from the Federal Rule, because the Federal Rule allows excerpts
from publications to be read on both direct examination and cross-examination,
while California's rule allows statements from the publication to be read on crossexamination only. Canepa, supra note 13, at 54.
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2008
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admissibility, 3 1 and it appears that California has done the same in
applying California Evidence Code section 721(b)(3). 32 While
California's rule is modeled after the federal rule, it is not identical to
it. 33 California's rule is "specifically a rule of cross-examination" and
does not allow for the use of such publications on direct
examination. 34 FRE 803(18), alternatively, is an exception to the
hearsay rule, and therefore
permits publications on both direct and
35
cross-examination.
Because California Evidence Code section 721(b)(3) merely
models FRE 803(18), California's rules and procedures for admitting
publications on cross-examination differ from federal standards.
Unfortunately, without any published California cases interpreting the
California rule, attorneys and judges alike have little guidance as to
what procedures are required for establishing 36the reliability of a text.
This has raised several unanswered questions.
II. LACK OF CASE LAW INTERPRETING CALIFORNIA'S RULE HAS LEFT
MANY QUESTIONS UNANSWERED

When evaluating California Evidence Code section 721, it is
important to remember that the traditional rule was adopted because it
was considered proper cross-examination to test the competency of
the witnesses as experts and to test the overall value of their
testimony. 37 The code Section was not adopted to allow crossexamining attorneys to present evidence to the jury that sustained their

31. Allen v. Safeco Ins. Co., 782 F.2d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing FED.
R. EVID. 803(18) advisory committee's note).
32. See, e.g., People v. Ledesma, 140 P.3d 657, 699 (Cal. 2006) ("scope of
cross-examination permitted is broad and includes examination aimed at
determining whether the expert sufficiently took into account matters arguably
inconsistent with expert's conclusion.").
33. Canepa, supra note 13, at 50 (citing CAL. EID. CODE § 721 cmt.; 3
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 1903 (3d ed. 1986)).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See generally supra note 10.

37. Fisher v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 26 P. 894, 896 (Cal. 1891); accord
People v. Hooper, 51 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol45/iss2/6

8

EstablishingRELIABILITY
Reliability Under
California
Evidence
Code
Section 7 483
2009]Payne:
ESTABLISHING
UNDER
CAL. Ev[D.
CODE
§ 721(B)(3)

theory of the case. 38 In fact, California law prohibited learned treatises
39
from being used as substantive evidence.
The addition of subsection (b)(3) to California Evidence Code
section 721 significantly changed the traditional rule. Subsection
(b)(3) states that an expert testifying in the form of an opinion may be
cross-examined "in regard to the content or tenor of any scientific,
technical, or professional text, treatise, journal, or similar publication"
if the publication has been established as a reliable authority by the
expert on the stand, or by the testimony of any other expert, or by
judicial notice.40 Because there are no published California cases to
resolve how this new amendment should be applied, we must look to
legislative intent. The California legislature intended that the
amendment would be used to test an expert's opinion when that expert
41
testified "contrary to well-accepted treatises."
The legislative intent indicates that the purpose of California
Evidence Code section 721 is no longer simply to impeach expert
testimony but also to "counter opposing expert opinions ... thereby,
reducing the time and expense of having to call another expert."42
Therefore, the purpose of the amendment is to allow learned treatises
to substitute for live expert testimony, thus changing the original
purpose of the rule, as well as the safeguards imposed by the hearsay
rule.
One major problem with this change is that the legislative intent
indicates that "learned treatises" can be used to counter an expert's

opinion, while the actual language of the rule allows any publication
to counter an expert's opinion.4 3 With such a significant change in

California's evidentiary law, major questions have arisen: what are the
procedures for establishing authoritative status; is California Evidence

Code section 721(b)(3) governed by California Evidence Code
38. Fisher,26 P. at 896.
39. See, e.g., id.
40. CAL. EVID. CODE § 721(b)(3) (West 2007).

41. S. Rules Comm. Bill Analysis, supra note 4.
42. Id.
43. Compare S. Rules Comm. Bill Analysis, supra note 4 (stating that "learned
treatises" should be allowed to cross-examine an expert testifying contrary to such
"well-accepted treatises") with CAL. EVID. CODE § 721(b)(3) (West 2007)
(demonstrating that the actual rule allows any publication to be used to crossexamine an expert, provided it has been deemed reliable by the judge or any expert).
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2008
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sections 403 or 405 ;44 how is one opinion in an article deemed reliable
or authoritative when there are several competing theories in various
other articles; is notice required before using a text to cross-examine
an expert witness? California practitioners have had little guidance to
all of these unanswered questions.
A. What is the ProperProcedurefor DeterminingReliability When
there Has Been No JudicialNotice of Reliability?
It is unclear whether the requirement that a treatise be established
as reliable authority is governed by California Evidence Code sections
403 or 405. 45 This question is significant because the answer
determines the burden of proving authoritative status and determines
who decides if the burden is met.46 If the preliminary fact is within the
scope of Section 403, then it is up to the jury to decide whether it
exists, and the trial court merely determines whether there is evidence
sufficient to sustain a finding that it is reliable authority. 47 If Section
405 governs, however, then the trial court determines whether the text
is "authoritative" by a preponderance of the evidence.48
44. Lopez v. Rashidi, No. E030977, 2004 WL 161795, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App.

Jan. 28, 2004). California "Evidence Code section 400 et. seq. set[s] forth the
procedures to be utilized when the admissibility of certain evidence turns on the
determination of some 'preliminary fact."' People v. Simon, 228 Cal. Rptr. 855, 859
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
45. Lopez, 2004 WL 161795, at *12. There is ambiguity in all types of
evidentiary issues regarding whether California Evidence Code section 403 or 405
governs the preliminary determinations of admissibility:
Some writers have attempted to distinguish the kinds of questions to be
decided under... Section 403 from the kinds of questions to be decided
under... Section 405 on the ground that the former questions involve the
relevancy of the proffered evidence while the latter questions involve the
competency of evidence that is relevant.
CAL. EvD. CODE § 403 cmt. a (West 2007) (citing Maguire & Epstein, Preliminary
Questions of Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARV. L. REV.
392 (1927)); Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of
PreliminaryQuestions of Fact, 43 HARV. L. REV. 165 (1929)). However, "eminent
legal authorities sometimes differ over whether a particular preliminary fact question
is one of relevancy or competency." Id.
46. Morgan, supra note 45.
47. Id.
48. Id.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol45/iss2/6
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The resolution of this question will also determine whether
opposing counsel is permitted to provide evidence rebutting the claim
that a text is reliable. However, courts will rarely conduct mini-trials
to determine whether a text is sufficiently authoritative. Alternatively,
the Senate Judiciary Committee acknowledged that experts should not
be permitted to claim that an "obscure authority" is reliable.49 So how
does a court balance judicial efficiency with the danger of allowing
unreliable statements to be read to the jury as if they were substantive
scientific evidence?
For some time, other jurisdictions have allowed experts to be
cross-examined by reference to other reputable works in their field,
even if the experts have not relied on those works in forming their
opinion.50 However, it has taken much case law to determine the
proper procedures for this form of cross-examination. In evaluating
the Supreme Court decision Reilly v. Pinkus, the U.S. Court of
Appeals, D.C. Circuit, noted:
The [Reilly] Court does not say how the authority of those works is

to be determined. It seems clear from the facts given in the opinion
that it is unnecessary for the witness himself to recognize the
authority of the work. . . or even to have read it .... We think the
authority of the work is for the presiding officer to decide. And we

think he should have a broad discretion in determining,what-and
how much evidence may be presented on that question.

This quotation confirms that no set procedure exists for determining
the reliability of a publication in the federal courts. The burden is
essentially left on the judges to decide on an ad hoc basis what
publications are sufficiently authoritative. Of course, courts should
always have discretion to decide what and how much evidence may be
presented, but this D.C. Circuit decision did almost nothing to guide

49. S. JuDIcIARY COMM., 1997-1998 REG. SESS., S. COMM. ANALYSIS ON S.B.
73, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/sen/sb_0051100/sb_73_cfa_19970514
_104316_sen comm.html [hereinafter S. JuDIcIARY COMM. BILL ANALYSIS].
50. Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269, 275 (1949).
51. Dolcin Corp. v. F.T.C., 219 F.2d 742, 746 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (emphasis
added); see also Laird v. T.W. Mather, Inc., 331 P.2d 617, 622-23 (Cal. 1958)
(holding that the trial court "is given a wide discretion in controlling crossexamination affecting the knowledge and credibility of an expert witness.").
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judges in how authoritative status may be determined more quickly
and efficiently.
Some courts have commended trial judges for working with
counsel to structure a procedure for determining authoritative status
out of the presence of the jury, before cross-examination begins.5 2 In
Martin v. Zucker, the trial judge held a sidebar conference with
counsel, in which they all came to an agreement as to how plaintiff's
counsel could properly conduct the cross-examination of the defense's
expert witness with a learned treatise.5 3
Decisions such as Martin reveal that rules similar to California
Evidence Code section 721(b)(3) and FRE 803(18) are not necessarily
governed by any specific preliminary rule. Instead, the "presiding
officer" has discretion to determine how cross-examination may be
conducted.5 4 However, with no uniform procedure in the federal
system or in California, it is difficult to know at what point in the trial
a publication's authoritative status must be established.
The California State Bar sponsored the adoption of California
Evidence Code section 721(b)(3), and maintained that requiring
treatises to be established as reliable authority "ensures that outdated
or otherwise unreliable treatises [would] not be used inappropriately
to discredit an expert's opinion." 55 This quote suggests that a
publication must be established as reliable authority before there is an
opportunity to use the publication on cross-examination. This
assertion is also consistent with the language of the rule, which states
that an expert may not be cross-examined with a publication unless
the publication "has been established as reliable authority., 56 This
language reveals that reliability must already be established when
publications are used to cross-examine expert witnesses.
Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court held in Dabroe v.
Rhodes Co. that when a party fails to meet the burden to lay the
necessary foundation of showing that a publication is authoritative, the
jury should be instructed to disregard so much of the cross-

52. Martin v. Zucker, 479 N.E.2d 1000, 1003-04 (11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1985).

53. Id.
54. Dolcin Corp., 219 F.2d at 746 n.4.
55.

S. RULES COMM. BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 4.

56. CAL. EvID. CODE § 721(b)(3) (West 2007) (emphasis added).
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol45/iss2/6
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examination as relates to the publication in question.57 The decision in
Dabroe suggests that establishing authoritativeness should occur prior
This position is
to the use of the publication on cross-examination.
58
jurisdictions.
other
consistent with that of several
At least one federal circuit suggests that it would be beneficial, if
not necessary, to hold a preliminary determination as to whether a text
can be considered reliable authority. 59 In United States v. Downing,
the court analogized the examination of the reliability of a novel
scientific technique to the threshold determination required when
hearsay evidence is offered as an exception to the hearsay rule. 60 The
Downing court stated that the "conditions on the admission of hearsay
seem to ensure a level of trustworthiness such that the testimony is
likely to enhance the truth-seeking function of litigation. A
preliminary determination that a scientific technique is reliable serves
a similar purpose. 61
B. How is Reliability Proved?

Reading the plain language of the California statute, very little is
required to prove that a publication is "reliable authority." 62 The only
requirement for establishing a publication as reliable authority under
the CEC is for an expert to simply testify that the publication is

57. Dabroe v. Rhodes Co., 392 P.2d 317, 322 (Wash. 1964). However, the
California Legislature has acknowledged that, even if a judge cautions the jury that
"the statements read are not to be considered evidence of truth of the propositions
stated, there is [still] a danger that at least some jurors might rely on the author's
statements for this purpose." § 721 cmt.
58. Federico v. Ford Motor Co., 854 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006)
(holding learned treatises admissible on cross-examination only after the judge
decides that it is a reliable authority); Foster v. Barnes-Jewish Hosp., 44 S.W.3d
432, 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that in order to use scientific evidence to
examine an expert witness, counsel must first adduce evidence that the text is
reliable authority); Myron by and through Brock v. Doctors Gen. Hosp., 704 So. 2d
1083, 1092 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding it was error to permit crossexamination using treatises when they had not, at the time of cross-examination,
been proven as reliable authority).
59. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 721(b)(3) (West 2007).
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authoritative.63 The federal courts also seem to require very little.64
The Advisory Committee's Note to FRE 803(18)
adopts a liberal
65
interpretation of the rule favoring admissibility.
Nearly all jurisdictions following similar rules have concluded
that when an expert witness does not concede that a text is reliable
authority, the burden of proving authoritative status is on the crossexaminer. 66 Most jurisdictions agree that the overall determination of
authoritative status rests almost entirely within the trial court's
discretion, because it is in the best position to determine what is
67
sufficiently worthy of trust to be considered reliable authority.
Accordingly, how a text is deemed sufficiently reliable varies among
jurisdictions.
In California, the Senate Judiciary Committee voiced its concern
that, under the state's rule, counsel would "use a partisan expert on
direct examination to establish the reliability of an obscure authority,
which [could] then be used to attack the view of an opposing expert
on cross-examination." 6 8 However, proponents of the bill contended
that "the rule [had] been used in federal courts for years and [had]
' 69
operated to save resources and shorten trials."

63. Id.
64. See FED. R. EvID. 803(18). FRE 803(18) allows a text to be deemed
reliable by the testimony of any expert, which is a very low standard compared to
requirements imposed by other jurisdictions. Allen v. Safeco Ins. Co., 782 F.2d
1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(18) advisory committee's
note).
65. Allen, 782 F.2d at 1520 (citing FED. R. EvID. 803(18) advisory committee's
note). "Rule 803(18) is hinged upon [the position that a publication's authoritative
status] is established by any means." Id. This is the most liberal view "found in
decisions allowing use of the treatise on cross-examination." Id.
66. Dabroe v. Rhodes Co., 392 P.2d 317, 321-22 (Wash. 1964); see also Miller
v. Peterson, 714 P.2d 695, 700 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that cross-examiner
has burden to prove reliable authority); People v. Behnke, 353 N.E.2d 684, 689 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1976) (stating that burden is on cross-examiner to prove authoritativeness).
67. Zimmer v. State, 477 P.2d 971, 977 (Kan. 1970) (citing 4 Wigmore on
Evidence § 1692 (3d ed. 1967); KAN. Civ. PROc. CODE ANN. § 60-460 [cc], author's
cmt. (West 1970).
68. S. JUDICIARY COMM. BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 49.

69. Id. But see Canepa, supra note 13, at 54 ('This significant new amendment
will undoubtedly increase costs and expenses for all sides.").
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Courts interpreting FRE 803(18) assure that "[l]earned treatises
are considered trustworthy because 'they are written primarily for
professionals and are subject to scrutiny and exposure for inaccuracy,
with the reputation of the writer at stake."'' 70 However, in the age of
cutting-edge technology and new science, emerging theories change
original assumptions. A person may write several articles in a lifetime,
and the author's newer articles may be inconsistent with their former
ones as he or she adopts new theories over time. 7 1 How is one article
among several inconsistent theories deemed reliable or authoritative
in fields where there are several conflicting ideas, and everyone is an
expert? This question resonates in many different types of cases, such
as those involving DUI, medical malpractice, toxic torts, and product
liability.
When adopting California Evidence Code section 721(b)(3), the
Senate Judiciary Committee used the following terms as synonyms for
"reliable authority": "learned treatise," "well-accepted treatise,"
"recognized treatise," and a publication that establishes "a position
that is consistent with established thought. 7 2 Attempting to use an
article that is only one among several inconsistent articles does not
seem to fit the definitions of "reliable authority" as the Senate
Judiciary Committee envisioned. In light of the intent that texts used
on cross-examination would be so reliable that they had achieved the
status of a "learned treatise" or, at least, presented positions
"consistent with established thought," it seems that using any
publication, regardless of acceptance within its community, is contrary
to the legislative intent that the text be "well-accepted."
Other jurisdictions have stated that "the party propounding the
written material must show that it is generally accepted and regarded
as authoritative within the profession.,73 Missouri, for example, has
recognized that learned treatises are written without bias and are far
more trustworthy than other publications because they are "subjected
70. Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 991 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting FED. R.
EviD. 803(18) advisory committee's note).
71. See Meschino v. N. Am. Drager, Inc. 841 F.2d 429, 434 (1st Cir. 1988)
("Physicians engaged in research may write dozens of papers during a lifetime.
Mere publication cannot make them automatically reliable authority.").
72. S. RULES CoMM. BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 4.
73. Herrera v. DiMayuga, 904 S.W.2d 490, 494 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)
(emphasis added).
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to meticulous scrutiny by the author's peers. 7 4 This degree of
trustworthiness is not attributed to other publications "because many
are 'mere expressions of the authors' opinions on controversial
subjects' or 'relate to experimentation and speculation based upon
preliminary studies and are intended to invoke comment and
criticism. "75

The First Circuit requires that both the specific text to be used on
cross-examination and its sponsors be deemed authoritative. 76 The
court explained that there is incredible pressure for researchers to
publish, and it is partly because of this pressure that many publications
do "not reach the dignity of a 'reliable authority.' 7 7 The court further
noted that, even if an expert testified that a particular magazine was
"highly regarded," such testimony would not render all of the contents
within the magazine reliable authority. 78 Each article must be
established as authoritative, regardless of how reputable the periodical
or its editor.79
There are no bright line rules in California state courts or the
federal courts for establishing the authoritative status of publications.
As long as an expert witness has testified that a text is authoritative,
then the foundation has been laid and excerpts from that publication
may be read to the jury. 80 While a publication can be established as
"reliable authority" by the testimony of any expert, it is still up to the
trial court to ensure that the text has the requisite element of
81
trustworthiness before allowing the text to be read to the jury.
74. Id. (quoting Grippe v. Momtazee, 705 S.W.2d 551, 556-57 (Mo. Ct. App.

1986)).
75. Id.
76. See Meschino, 841 F.2d at 434.

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. CAL. EVID. CODE § 721(b)(3) (West 2007). Of course, it may be very
difficult to establish any one article as authoritative in the profession when there are
multiple competing theories in that specific field. See Canepa, supra note 13, at 52

(acknowledging the difficulty in establishing the reliability of "'cutting edge'
theories or techniques").
81. See, e.g., Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 991 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that

even if a text qualified as a learned treatise under FED. R. EVID. 803(18), its
admission would remain subject to a balancing of probative value against danger of
prejudice under FED. R. EVID. 403).
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol45/iss2/6
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C. Is Notice Required?
Another significant issue that California courts have yet to address
is whether counsel is required to provide notice that a certain
publication will be used on cross-examination. 82 Those opposing this
requirement argue that requiring such notice will provide opposing
83
counsel with a roadmap of the attorney's impeachment strategy.
Accordingly, disclosure "significantly diminishes impeachment value
at trial.",84 On the other hand, supporters of pretrial disclosure note that
a lack of notice may lead to unfair surprise because attorneys and their
experts would be ambushed by publications that they have never read
85
and know nothing about.
When adopting FRE 803(18), the Advisory Committee
acknowledged the potential problem of unfair surprise. "Although
three members of the committee supported reasonable notice no later
than the pretrial conference, the committee decided to address this
problem in the advisory note .... The proposed language was never
included., 8 6 Some states have also recognized that withholding notice
of the content of learned treatises to be used on cross-examination
may open the rule to abuse. 87 For example, Massachusetts requires
counsel to provide notice at least thirty days before trial of any text
they anticipate to use, and "[f]ailure to do so subjects the publication
' 88
to exclusion."
82. See, e.g., Rosen v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. A113267, 2007 WL
3361312, at *14 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2007).
83. Mike Trentalange, Use of Learned Treatises on Cross-Examination:
PracticalConsiderations,79 FLA. BAR J. 44, 45-46 (2005).

84. Id. at 46.
85. See Canepa, supra note 13, at 52.
86. Charles J. Walsh & Beth S. Rose, Increasing the Usefid Information
Provided by Experts in the Courtroom: A Comparisonof FederalRules of Evidence
703 and 803(18) with the Evidence Rules in Illinois, Ohio, and New York, 26 SETON
HALL L. REv. 183, 254 n.220 (1995) (quoting Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
CriminalJustice, 93rd Cong. 290 (1973)).

87. See, e.g., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 89 Ill.
516, 519-20 (111.
1878) ("Great care should always be taken by the court to confine such crossexamination within reasonable limits, and to see that the quotations read to the
witness are so fairly selected as to present the author's views on the subject of the
examination.").
88. Canepa, supra note 13, at 52 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch 233, §79c
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2008
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Another factor favoring the establishment of a notice requirement
is efficiency, since lack of notice may result in undue consumption of
time at the trial. If no notice is required, experts will be forced to take
time while testifying to read excerpts of the text to determine whether
they agree with it. The costs of litigation would also necessarily
increase.89 Further, without a pretrial disclosure requirement, it may
be very difficult for opposing counsel to verify that what is being read
for the first time on cross-examination is in fact being read in the
correct context, and not just as a result of cherry-picking statements
that are out of context. 90 There needs to be some rule of disclosure to
91
avoid unfair surprise.
Although many jurisdictions have required such disclosure, 92 and
courts have discretion to so require if requested by counsel, 93 there is
no overall requirement in either California or the federal courts that
counsel provide notice of the publication and its contents before using
it to cross-examine the opposing party's expert witness. 94 Moreover,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3) "exempts parties from the
obligation to disclose information to be used at trial solely for
impeachment." 95 Because FRE 803(18) allows texts to be used on
cross-examination as substantive evidence, rather than mere
impeachment evidence, many trial attorneys argue that in federal

(1997)).
89. "[C]ases that depend on the testimony of experts are among the costliest."
Canepa, supra note 13, at 54. Because California Evidence Code section 721(b)(3)
does not require notice of what publications will be used in trial, attorneys must be
prepared for any publication: "[c]ounsel ...can no longer rely primarily on his or
her own expert to provide scientific or other information without doing their own
review of available literature. The increased time will be reflected in higher attorney
bills and expert fees." Id.
90. James M. Roux & Theodore F. Roberts, Cross-Examining an Adversary's
Expert with a Learned Treatise: Maine Trial Practice and Procedure, 14 ME. B.J.
220, 222 (July 1999).
91. Canepa, supra note 13, at 52.
92. Id. (citing MASS.GEN. LAWS ch 233, §79c (1997)).
93. Id.
94. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 721(b)(3) (West 2007); FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
95. Trentalange, supra note 83, at 46 (citing Bearint ex rel Bearint v. Dorell
Juvenile Group, Inc., 389 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2004)).
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol45/iss2/6
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trial."
D. CaliforniaEvidence Code Section 352: PrejudicialEffect Versus
the Probative Value of Publicationson Cross-Examination
Finally, there has been acknowledgement that using publications
on cross-examination will "undoubtedly increase costs and expenses
for all sides." 97 This runs contrary to the goals envisioned by the
Senate Judiciary Committee in proposing the rule: to save time and
money. 98 The Senate Judiciary Committee made clear that California
Evidence Code section 721(b)(3) was intended to "reduce litigation
costs by permitting recognized and learned treatises to be used to
counter opposing expert opinions through cross-examination, thereby
reducing the time and expense of having to call another expert to
battle the opposing expert to establish a position which is consistent
with established thought." 99
Unfortunately, allowing any publication to be used to crossexamine expert witnesses has often confused juries and lengthened the
time spent in trial. 10 Some courts have recognized a responsibility to
balance the probative value with prejudicial effects of publications
used on cross-examination.0 1 The following cases reveal that a
prejudicial effect argument based on California Evidence Code section
352 may be the best way for California attorneys to get publications
02
barred from cross-examining an expert witness.'
96. Id.
97. Canepa, supra note 13, at 54.
98. S. RULES COMM. BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 4.

99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 86
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (discussing the threat of juries being misled and confused when
articles, and not treatises, are read into evidence); see also Hoffschlaeger Co. v.
Fraga, 290 F. 146, 148 (9th Cir. 1923) (discussing how the trial was lengthened
because of cross-examination and attempts to have excerpts from texts read allowed
on cross-examination).
101. See, e.g., Apicella, 66 F.R.D. at 86; see also Schneider v. Revici, 817
F.2d 987, 991 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that even if a text qualified as a learned treatise
under FED. R. EVID. 803(18), its admission would remain subject to a balancing of
probative value against danger of prejudice under FED. R. EVID. 403).
102. California Evidence Code section 352 gives the court discretion to
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2008
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In Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories,Inc., the court recognized the
dangers of unfair prejudice that may arise when articles, rather than
learned treatises, are used in evidence. 0 3 The court was concerned
that the jury would focus on the accuracy of the proposed article rather
than the liability issue before them. 104 The court also voiced concerns
that the trial would be "considerably extended" if the validity of the
article needed to be tried. 0 5 After weighing the need and probative
value of the article against the dangers of unfair prejudice and
consumption of time, the court excluded the relevant evidence under
FRE 403, the federal rule analogous to California's prejudicial effect
rule. 106
Similarly, in Hoffschlaeger Co. v. Fraga, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
refused to require a witness to get a book from his home and look in
17
the book for a passage that counsel believed was within the text. 0
The court said that "[i]f counsel desired to contradict the witness by
some statement of the author, he should have called the attention of
the witness to the statement, and not consume the time of the court by
asking the witness to look for something that might or might not
exist. ' ' 108 The Hoffschlaeger decision suggests that to avoid exclusion
of evidence under FRE 403 (or the analogous California Evidence
Code section 352), counsel must be well-prepared to call specific
passages to the attention of expert witnesses and cannot waste time in
doing so.
Because one of the main purposes of California Evidence Code
section 721 (b)(3) was to save time and expense, allowing a procedure
that requires the expenditure of additional time and money to establish
a publication as reliable authority seems to defeat the purpose of the
code Section. Thus, counsel may argue under California Evidence
exclude evidence if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed
by "the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury." CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 2007).
103. Apicella, 66 F.R.D. at 86.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 87.
107. Hoffschlaeger Co. v. Fraga, 290 F. 146, 148 (9th Cir. 1923).
108. Id.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol45/iss2/6
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Code section 352 that the probative value of impeaching an expert
witness on cross-examination through the use of a publication is
substantially outweighed by the probability of undue consumption of
time and confusing the jury. California courts have "broad discretion
to weigh the prejudicial impact of testimony against its probative
value." 10 9 Therefore, a California Evidence Code section 352 motion
can be a good solution if such a problem arises in trial." 0
One last consideration is the general rule that "[a]n expert witness
may not be cross-examined regarding matters that are not relevant to
'
the expert's opinion or qualifications." 11
Thus, attorneys should be
wary of the opposing party using publications that do not relate to the
expert's testimony nor help test the expert's qualifications. In such a
case, an objection to the use of the publication based on relevancy
grounds would be appropriate.
III. A NEW APPROACH TO ADMITFING LEARNED
TREATISES ON CROSS-EXAMINATION

Allowing any publication to be established as reliable by the
testimony of any expert seems inconsistent with other California
evidentiary rules. In determining the reliability of publications to be
used on cross-examination, California courts should apply the same
test used when determining the reliability of new scientific techniques:
the Kelly test."' 2
109. People v. Lancaster, 158 P.3d 157, 181 (Cal. 2007) (citing People v.
Rodrigues, 885 P.2d 1, 33 (Cal. 1994)); see also People v. Ledesma, 140 P.3d 657,

699 (Cal. 2006) ('The scope of cross-examination permitted under section 721 is
broad, and includes examination aimed at determining whether expert sufficiently

took into account matters arguably inconsistent with expert's conclusion.").
110. See supra notes 100-09 and accompanying text. A California Evidence
Code section 352 argument may be particularly beneficial when each party has

separate expert witnesses prepared to testify, because attorneys can argue that the
jury would be especially confused if they had to listen to two or more experts testify
and were further subjected to hearing excerpts of publications challenging each
expert's opinion. Not only would a jury be confused by so many differing opinions,
but the trial would be considerably lengthened if several experts testified, and each

expert was subject to cross-examination with the use of publications.
111. People v. Smithey, 978 P.2d 1171, 1184 (Cal. 1999).
112. See generally People v. Bolden, 58 P.3d 931, 949 (Cal. 2002) (outlining
the requirements of the Kelly test) (citing People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal.
1976)).
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A. Why the Kelly Test Should Apply to the Admissibility of
Publicationson Cross-Examination
The bill history of California Evidence Code section 721 shows
that texts would be deemed reliable if they were learned treatises, or
well-accepted treatises or texts that revealed opinions consistent with
established thought." l3 However, subdivision (b)(3) allows any
publication to be established as reliable as long as any expert has
testified as such.11 4 Allowing any publication is not the same as
allowing texts which have reached notoriety so high as to be deemed
learned and well-accepted treatises. Allowing the use of magazine
articles, or even medical pamphlets, as long as they are published,
seems too low a standard, and may not provide enough safeguards to
protect trustworthiness. Because most publications have not reached
the status of learned treatise, it is crucial that there be higher standards
in determining their reliability rather than deeming them reliable
simply because an expert testified as such.
Another compelling reason for requiring a more stringent standard
when deeming a publication a reliable authority is that excerpts from
publications are now admissible as substantive evidence.
Traditionally, California did not allow publications on crossexamination because there was a concern they would be used for more
than impeachment evidence.1 15 Texts were not permitted if it was
apparent the cross-examining party was using the publication to
support his or her own theory rather than to impeach the opposing
expert on the stand. 1 6 This is because California Evidence Code
section 721 was not, and still is not, an exception to the hearsay
rule. 1 7 Accordingly, the rule does not have the additional safeguards
generally attached to hearsay exceptions. Since the addition of
subdivision (b)(3), however, publications may be used as substantive
evidence rather than for impeachment purposes only, even though the
1 8
amendment failed to include any additional safeguards.
113. S. RULES COMM. BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 4.

114. CAL. EVID. CODE § 721(b)(3) (West 2007).
115. See Fisher v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 26 P. 894, 896 (Cal. 1891).
116. Id.
117. Canepa, supra note 13, at 50.
118. The rule states that "relevant portions of [admissible publications] may be
read into evidence," thus explicitly permitting publications to be used as substantive
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol45/iss2/6
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Similarly, FRE 803(18) does not make a distinction between the
use of publications for impeachment purposes and the use of
publications for substantive evidence.1 19 Federal Rule 803(18)
provides that "statements made in published treatises, periodicals, or
pamphlets" which are established as reliable authority by the
testimony or admission of an expert are not excluded by the hearsay
rule. 120 The rule further states that such statements "may be read into
evidence but may not be received as exhibits." 121 Thus, the Federal
Rule allows a publication to be read into the record as substantive
evidence as long as the proponent established that the text was
authoritative. 122 Allowing publications to be used as substantive
evidence is supported by a great deal of case law.1 23 Because texts are
being used for more than mere impeachment, but also as substantive
evidence, it is crucial that there be higher standards in determining
their reliability before they are admitted, and the Kelly test provides
those needed standards. 124
B. How Kelly Applies to Scientific Techniques, and How it Could
Apply to Publications
To establish the reliability of a new scientific technique, the Kelly
test requires that the propounding party show that the technique has
gained general acceptance in the community. 125 The Kelly test was
generally known as the Kelly-Frye test, because Kelly was a California
decision which relied heavily on the reasoning in the federal decision,

evidence rather than mere impeachment. CAL. EVID. CODE § 721(b)(3) (West 2007).
119. FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The language in California's rule is nearly identical to the language in
the Federal Rule. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 721(b)(3).
123. Tart v. McGann, 697 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1982) (listing cases from the
Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits, all of which support the proposition that learned
treatises are permitted for impeachment purposes and as substantive evidence).
124. See generally People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994) (detailing the
safeguards inherent in the Kelly test, and the many reasons for keeping the test as it

is).
125. People v. Williams, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521, 527 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (citing
People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976)).
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Frye v. United States. 126 However, in 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court
held in the Daubert decision that "the Federal Rules of Evidence had
superseded Frye."'12 7 According to Daubert, general acceptance is not
required to prove that a new scientific technique is reliable, and
instead, the Federal Rules of Evidence "assign to the trial judge the
task of ensuring that an expert's testimony [is reliable and
relevant] .128
However, the California Supreme Court has made clear that Kelly
survived the Daubert decision.1 29 Accordingly, to establish the
reliability of new scientific techniques in California, attorneys are still
required to show that the techniques are generally accepted in the
relevant scientific community before they will be admitted in
evidence. 130 Said another way, under Kelly, the court does not have to
decide whether a new scientific technique is reliable because
13 1
reliability is determined by the applicable scientific community.
California courts can foster consistency by applying this same
standard when allowing publications to be used on cross-examination.
Thus, propositions written in a given publication should be deemed
reliable only if those propositions have gained general acceptance in
the pertinent field. If opposing counsel disagrees that a specific
publication has gained general acceptance within its relevant
community, then he or she should be permitted to attempt to rebut the
presumption of reliability, as is permitted when determining the
reliability of new scientific techniques under Kelly.132 A court may
decide that a given publication is unreliable if several reputable

126. People v. Bolden, 58 P.3d 931, 949 (Cal. 2002).
127. Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,

587 (1993)).
128. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
129. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 331 (Cal. 1994). The California Supreme
Court essentially held that Kelly, which was based on the Federal decision, Frye,

ensured integrity in the trial. Id. The Court stated that Daubert ignored the merits of
Frye and there was simply "no justification for reconsidering
Kelly." Id.

...

[the] holding in

130. Id.
131. Bolden, 58 P.3d at 950.
132. See id. at 664 (allowing each side to present arguments as to whether the
scientific technique was in fact generally accepted and therefore reliable).
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol45/iss2/6
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experts in the relevant 33field have publicly opposed the propositions
within the publication.'
One major drawback of the Kelly standard, however, is that in a
field where there are multiple competing scientific theories, it may be
the case that none of them will be generally accepted in the
community. Accordingly, the Kelly standard may be very difficult, if
not impossible, to meet in such a case. This is especially problematic
when it comes to new and "cutting edge" theories, because general
acceptance may not occur until long periods of time have passed and
eventually one theory is deemed more reliable by the community than
the others. 134 Notwithstanding, the reliability gained by applying Kelly
safeguards to publications admitted on cross-examination' 35 far
outweighs the complications that could arise when multiple scientific
publications propose competing theories, none of which have gained
136
general acceptance in the community.
IV. CONCLUSION

California Evidence Code section 721, which traditionally
allowed the use of learned treatises on cross-examination for
impeachment purposes only, has been widely expanded by the
inclusion of subdivision (b)(3). This amendment allows parties to use
publications to cross-examine an expert witness not just for
impeachment purposes, but also as substantive evidence. 137 California
has no published cases interpreting this ten-year-old amendment,
therefore leaving plenty of room for interpretation
of the rule and the
1 38
procedures needed to implement the rule.
133. This is the practice when courts find that scientific techniques have been
publicly opposed and deemed unreliable by several scientists in the applicable field.

Id. at 665.
134. See Canepa, supra note 13, at 52 (acknowledging the difficulty in
establishing the reliability of ".cutting edge' theories or techniques").
135. See generally People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994) (detailing the
safeguards inherent in the Kelly test, and the many reasons for keeping the test as it

is).
136. See id at 327-31.
137. Id.
138. The only cases the author has located regarding the interpretation of CAL.
EVID. CODE § 721(b)(3) have been unpublished cases which reveal the significant
need for more consistency and some sort of interpretation by a higher court. See
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As a result, there is much inconsistency within California's
evidentiary law. California Evidence Code section 721(b)(3) allows
relevant portions of a publication to be read into evidence once the
publication is established as reliable. 39 Reliability can be established
when any expert testifies that the publication is reliable, even if other
experts in the community believe otherwise. 140 In contrast, when
dealing with the admission of scientific techniques, California courts
must follow the Kelly test, which requires that the technique be
generally accepted within the relevant scientific community before
reliability is established. 14 Kelly has been analyzed numerous times in
California case law, and the California Supreme Court continues to
adhere to the standard because of the protections it offers in
combating the "misleading aura
of certainty" which often
42
accompanies scientific evidence. 1
Because California's evidentiary law offers little guidance in the
application of California Evidence Code section 721(b)(3), attorneys
and judges alike could benefit significantly from the application of the
Kelly standard to the determination of whether publications are

generally Rosen v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. Al 13267, 2007 WL 3361312, at
*14 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2007) (each party and the trial judge had separate and
conflicting interpretations of Section 721, and of how a publication may be deemed
reliable); Lopez v. Rashidi, No. E030977, 2004 WL 161795, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 28, 2004) ("[ilt is not clear whether the requirement that [a] treatise be
established as reliable authority is governed by Evidence Code section 403" or 405);
Stoll v. Bush, No. B159275, 2003 WL 22792314, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25,
2003) (acknowledging that neither party, nor the court's own research had disclosed
any California case on point regarding whether California Evidence Code section
721 required reliability to be established by a "designated expert.").
139. CAL. EVID. CODE § 721(b)(3) (West 2007).
140. Id.
141. People v. Williams, 46 Cal. App. 4th (App. Ct. 1996) (citing People v.
Kelly, 549 P2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976)).
142. Roberti v. Andy's Termite & Pest Control, Inc., 113 Cal. App. 4th 893,
899-900 (App. Ct. 2003).
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reliable enough to be used as substantive evidence on cross-

examination. This would not only add consistency to California
evidentiary law, but would also provide the procedures and guidelines
that have been absent in admitting excerpts of publications on crossexamination.
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